Esse artigo parte de um relato de compreensão recente de sua autora como mulher negra de pele clara. Evocam-se, a partir daí, temas referentes ao pertencimento racial, no caminho percorrido até essa autodeclaração, e se põem em relevo, em perspectiva sócio-histórica, dispositivos como colorismo e tokenismo, a fim de se investigar o entendimento de si como pessoa negra e as formas pelas quais a branquitude pretende controlar relações e interações entre pessoas de diferentes tonalidades de pele.

Este artigo é parte de uma pesquisa de Mestrado em Ciências Ambientais que investigou “A relação mulher-natureza na Comunidade Remanescente do Quilombo de Fojo, Itacaré – BA”, através da abordagem descritiva e análise quantitativa e qualitativa de dados, buscando aprofundamento teórico para tratar de relações de gênero, gênero e meio ambiente e a importância do papel da mulher na organização cotidiana das comunidades tradicionais, inclusive de remanescentes de quilombos. Os sujeitos da pesquisa foram mulheres e homens da Comunidade de Fojo (...) que decidiram pela participação, utilizando entrevistas semiestruturadas, observação direta e sistemática e conversas informais, em profundidade, realizadas entre 2014-2015. O recorte aqui apresentado tem por objetivo discutir o papel da mulher na comunidade do quilombo de Fojo e sua relação com a natureza. Os resultados indicam relações desiguais entre homens e mulheres na comunidade, às mulheres têm sido designado papel/posição, modos de cuidar da família, ficam responsáveis em “trazer harmonia e paz para o lar”, “cuidar e ser dona de casa”, cabendo a elas a área pertencente a do privado – a casa, alguns serviços na roça e a participação na igreja evangélica, deixando a tradição esquecida. A relação mulher-natureza, ao que parece, indica práticas agrícolas equivocadas e, ao que tudo indica, o conhecimento dos moradores sobre a agricultura ainda é tímido, demonstram fragilidades de técnicas empregadas, falta recursos à implementação de ferramentas adequadas, ausência de assistência técnica especializada e conhecimentos por parte dos produtores de técnicas básicas de produção. Palavras-chave: Relação Mulher-Natureza. Mulher Quilombola. Sustentabilidade. (shrink)

O objetivo desta publicação é incentivar a produção filosófica de excelência por parte de pesquisadores notadamente influenciados pela filosofia de Wittgenstein e cujos temas possam suscitar um debate aprofundado. Além de desafiar o empreendimento filosófico contemporâneo, os temas aqui apresentados abordam questões que muitas vezes estão além daquelas consideradas por Wittgenstein em seu tempo. O leitor encontrará neste volume questões relacionadas ao ceticismo semântico e epistêmico, ao relativismo ético, às leituras literárias de Wittgenstein, ao problema das outras mentes e percepção (...) de aspectos, a intersubjetividade e o caráter contrassensual do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, e, também, relacionadas ao Paradoxo de Moore. (shrink)

El concepto kantiano de "interés de la razón" significa en el orden teórico el impulso hacia un saber integral de las condiciones y de la voluntad de sistema, a la vez que se funde con el sentimiento de necesidad de la razón de una unidad y totalidad incondicionadas. Caracteriza así a la subjetividad finita. En el orden práctico, el interés de la razón en el cumplimiento de un orden de fines se considera la instauración de la realidad ética, mediante la (...) cual el individuo se apropia de la universalidad de la ley. Determina así el status de la subjetividad libre, aunque sensible. Este concepto permite, por tanto, una comprensión íntegra y radical de la subjetividad humana en el horizonte de una filosofía del espíritu como impulso de autorrealización. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments A Literary Review: Two Ages further reading.

Soren Kierkegaard's Works of Love, a series of deliberations on the commandment to love one's neighbor, has often been condemned by critics. Here, Ferreira seeks to rehabilitate Works of Love as one of Kierkegaard's most important works. He shows that Kierkegaard's deliberations on love are highly relevant to some important themes in contemporary ethics, including impartiality, duty, equality, mutuality, reciprocity, self-love, sympathy, and sacrifice. Ferreira also argues that Works of Love bears on issues peculiar to a religious ethic, (...) such as the role of God as "middle term," and the possibility of preserving the aesthetic dimensions of love in a religious ethic of relation. (shrink)

Este artigo refere-se ao conhecido episódio da famosa novela "Gargantua", de Rabelais, e a sua intenção é mostrar que naquelas singulares sociedade e arquitectura se apresentam ou prefigu­ram, em larga medida, as questões que mais tarde foram exploradas no pensamento utópico oci­dental sobre o tema de "Antiutopia". Em particular, há a intenção de mostrar as relações entre as "Sociedades Ideais" e as "Arquitecturas Ideais"... Como se mutuamente se implicassem. – E, claro, os hilariantes equívocos relacionados com tal...

In the debate over the ontological structures of the entity that exists as being-in-the-world, the French philosopher Henri Maldiney focuses his theoretical developments on the unintentional and pre-predicative dimension of experience, where sensing (sentir) takes its origin, and based on which the Existentials of “encounter”, “surprise” and “rhythm”, that are key to understanding the aesthetic-artistic experience, are explained in the horizon of transpassibility and transpossibility. Given that that dimension is the privileged field of encounter with art, this paper will raise (...) the question of the nexus of the articulation between art and image. This question will be developed through the opposition of form and image, of the reality of image and the image of reality, and the aesthetic vision and imaginative vision. In this analysis, we will rely upon the Heideggerian conception of Existence, as well as some of Husserl’s and the neuro-psychiatrist Erwin Straus’s researches into the passive dimension of experience, with the purpose of showing how Maldiney, starting from them, contributed in a singular and significant way to the deepening of that unintentional dimension of existence which he calls “pathic”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Natural History: Religion and "Explanation" M. JAMIE FERREIRA HUME'S BOLDLYSIMPLESTATEMENTof the genesis of religion--that "the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst for revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries" led humankind to see "the first obscure traces of divinity"--is supported by appeals to what he considers plain common sense.' For example, given that at "the first origin (...) of society" (e4) our ancestors were obviously "ignorant and barbarous" (23), anxiously helpless in the face of threatening natural events--hence, obviously with neither the leisure nor the impulse nor the aptitude for serious reflection--it was obviously passionate fears and hopes, not reason, which motivated their beliefs. Given that the mind obviously "rises from inferior to superior," and that humankind obviouslyhasn't "inhabited palaces before huts and cottages or studied geometry before agriculture" (~4), polytheism obviously antedated monotheism. In the course of detailing his commonsensical account of the origin and development of religion, Hume highlights a wide variety of natural tendencies, principles, and propensities which are operative. Keith Yandell offers a recent reading of one such propensity at work in the origin of religion--namely, what Hume calls the "propensity of human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction" (29)--and Yandell explicitly takes it to be a propensity to an "explanatory" system.2 I want to argue in what follows that any reading of Hume's account of religion which highlights an explanatory motivation can be significantly misleading insofar as it obscures the way in which Hume's account differs markedly from other classical genetic accounts which emphasize explanation. ' The Natural History ofReligion, ed. H. E. Root (Stanford, CA, 1956), 28. Further parenthetical page references in the text will be to this work. His later formulation--"The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events" (65)--recalls Philo's pithy version, namely, "terror is the primary principle of religion" (Dialoguesconcerning Natural Religion, XII). ~Hume's "Inexplicable Mystery": His Views on Religion (Philadelphia, 199o), 9. Hereafter HIM. [5931 594 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 In his account of the "propensity of human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction," Yandell admits that "no explanation is given of exactly what sort of satisfaction is in question," yet he goes on without a pause to speak of how "people accept different and various explanatory systems"; referring to a natural "propensity to understand," he concludes that "for Hume, we need not accept a religious system of explanation, but most of us in fact do so."s I suggest that Yandell's shift from "system" to "explanatory system," which is unheralded, is of crucial significance because the emphasis on explanation tends to call to a reader's mind just the sort of appeal which Hume decisively rejects. I shall argue that Hume draws our attention to and decisively excludes from his account a concept of explanation which actually does play an important role in other parallel accounts--namely, a concept which focuses on the integrity of a broad picture and an ultimate accounting; Hume points to such a concept in his references to the "frame of the universe," "final causes," and the "first rise of the visible system." Such a role might seem to elaborate Hume's appeal to common sense--after all, isn't the natural response to "unknown causes" to try to understand them, and isn't the attempt to understand them the same as looking for an "ultimate" explanation, however crude it might be at the outset? Although this might seem commonsensical to others (as we shall see), I want to argue that what Hume sees at work in the origin of religion is not a search for such an explanation, even a crude one. Rather, on Hume's view the only curiosity at work is a curiosity about how to cope: the propensity to a system is the propensity to the kind of determinacy which is expedient for control, and the only satisfaction the system provides is one in terms of a coping which is independent of truth-seeking... (shrink)

This chapter discusses different views on religion and ethics from the viewpoint of Emmanuel Levinas and Søren Kierkegaard, and their insightful comparisons and contrasts to the viewpoints of Merold Westphal. It presents the qualifications that can be made for such comparison, first with Kierkegaard, then to Levinas. It argues that if Kierkegaard's view is that “God always stands between me and my neighbor”, it is then related to the view of Levinas, that is “the neighbor always stands between me and (...) God”. The only difference is that for Levinas, ethics comes first before religion. (shrink)

This book examines the significantly similar, yet finally different, thinking of two nineteenth-century existentialist thinkers, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Its focus is on the different ways each envisioned a joyful acceptance of life - a concern they shared. Each strove to give a place to this acceptance in his picture of life, but their conceptions of it are far apart.

Apresentam-se os resultados clínicos principais de uma primeira investigação efectuada a familiares de doentes sob tratamento paliativo no domicílio da área de Lisboa, com o instrumento de medida da satisfação SERVQUAL Modificado. Dos 58 familiares/doentes que responderam ao questionário apenas uma minona estava insatisfeita (uma classe de 5 indivíduos mostra-se francamente insatisfeita), uma classe de 15 estava moderadamente satisfeita, havendo 38 individuos fortemente satisfeitos com a qualidade e prontidäo dos serviços prestados. Porém urna percentagem elevada de doentes, segundo a opinião (...) retrospectiva dos cuidadores, faleceu com sintomatologia agravada, nomeadamente dores (60%), obstipação (67%) e depressão/ansiedade (43%). Discute-se a consistência e validade do questionáno SERVQUAL Modificado, contextualizam-se os resultados no que é o standard da prática da MCP e integram-se na promoção da dignidade humana no fim da vida. We present the main clinical findings of research on palliative home care, carried out among relatives of patients in the Lisbon area. An adapted version of SERVQUAL was used. Of a total of 58 carers surveyed only a small number (5) was unsatisfied 15 were only moderately satisfied. 38 family carers were strongly satisfied with the services. Yet, a high percentage of patients, as viewed in retrospect by their relatives died with some aggravated symptoms: 60% with more pain, 67% constipation, and 43% anxiety/depression. We discuss the consistency and validity of this adapted SERVQUAL tool and the main results are contextualized beanng in mind the standard practice of palliative medicine and the pursuit of human dignity in death. (shrink)

Much has been made of the Kierkegaardian flavour of Wittgenstein's thought on religion, both with respect to its explicit allusions to Kierkegaard and its implicit appeals. Even when significant disparities between the two are noted, there remains an important core of de facto methodological agreement between them, addressing the limits of theory and the dispelling of illusion. The categories of ‘nonsense’ and ‘paradox’ are central to Wittgenstein's therapeutic enterprise, while the categories of ‘paradox’ and the ‘absurd’ are central to much (...) of Kierkegaard's attempt to dispel religious illusion. Writing of how the ‘urge to thrust against the limits of language’ yields ‘nonsense’, Wittgenstein explicitly appealed to Kierkegaard: ‘Kierkegaard, too, recognized this thrust and even described it in much the same way ’. 1 I want to consider whether Kierkegaard's category of paradox of the absurd is assimilable to Wittgenstein's view of nonsense and paradox. I shall argue that a consideration of Wittgenstein's view of paradox can highlight contrasting strands in Kierkegaard's writings on religious faith, strands which take paradox more or less strictly – in particular, it can clarify several different opinions concerning the status of religious claims. My exploration will bring to the fore some implications of the attempt to make room, in the religious employment of language, for a ‘higher understanding’ of truths which we are said to be able to grasp but cannot express. (shrink)

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief, to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects (...) an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument, but for failing to be the right sort of instinct. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Works Of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of Discourses Christian Discourses The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress The Point of View for My Work as an Author Three Godly Discourses further reading.

Understanding Animal Abuse and How to Intervene with Children and Young People offers a positive, compassion-based and trauma-informed approach to understanding and intervening in animal abuse. It provides an accessible cross-disciplinary synthesis of current international evidence on animal abuse, and a toolkit for professionals working with people and/or animals to help them understand, prevent, and intervene in cases of animal abuse. With contributions from experts in the field, this essential text offers ten user-friendly chapters with questions for reflection and key (...) summary points. It offers a definition of animal abuse, synthesises the latest research on children, young people and animal abuse, and explores the link between animal abuse and other forms of abuse, and legal perspectives on animal abuse. The second half of the book presents a practical toolkit for professionals, offering guidance and strategies for prevention of and intervention in cases of animal abuse. It provides multidisciplinary perspectives on interventions; from teachers' and social workers roles in detection and intervention of childhood animal abuse, to the roles of enforcement agencies and veterinarians in legal cases of adult animal abuse. Together with a final chapter proposing new directions for research, policy, and practice, this guide is for all who work with children, young people and/or animals, including psychologists, social workers, veterinarians, education professionals, and animal welfare educators. It is also key reading for those involved in legal and policy issues relating to animal welfare. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript by Merold WestphalM. Jamie FerreiraMerold Westphal. Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript.” West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 261. Cloth, $32.95. Paper, $16.95.The Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy describes itself as attempting to provide insight into a philosopher by means of a focus on a single (...) major text. Such a focus is unusual for a series in the history of philosophy, and Westphal’s [End Page 144] accomplishment in this study is a fine example of how fruitfully this can be done. Commentary on over six hundred pages of Kierkegaard’s Postscript is presented in ten manageable chapters, which follow the order of the Postscript and deal with segments of it ranging from as few as twelve pages to as many as one hundred and seventy-five pages. The result is a commentary which can wonderfully guide students through the Postscript in its entirety, or through the assignment of individual chapters to accompany discrete reading selections. Westphal’s discussions are informed by an unusually wide-ranging knowledge of the history of philosophy—he considers the text not only in relation to Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, as others commentators have, but also brings to this work his clear strengths in phenomenological, existential, and postmodern thought (so we get useful comparisons with Gadamer, Derrida, Levinas, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, among others). Lying behind Westphal’s entire approach to the book is his desire to address the two most common major criticisms of Kierkegaard’s thought, namely, that it is individualist and irrationalist. Thus, the major perspective from which everything is approached is the tension between the fallible yet responsible self—more precisely, the tension between individual and society, and the tension between irrationalist (voluntarist, blind) and rationalist. Westphal does a superb job of laying out the diversity of protests Climacus is registering in the Postscript—against Platonic intellectualism, against systematic philosophical speculation, and against the rhetorical compromising embodied in the “priest-orator.” There are, of course (as one would expect), sensible, suggestive, illuminating, and detailed exegeses of passages concerning all the significant themes associated with Climacus (approximation, appropriation, leap, direct communication, second reflection, dialectic, etc). Westphal examines the Postscript in the light of the distinction between Socratic religion and the non-Socratic (Christian) alternative found in the earlier Philosophical Fragments, to which this Postscript is an admittedly peculiar postscript, and employs material from much of Kierkegaard’s other work, including journal entries. With respect to the (in)famous category of leap, Westphal incorporates contemporary discussions of volitionalism and presents a fine summary of ways in which willing (decision) can be viewed as indirect, yet allowing the relevance of an ethics of belief. In fact, regarding even the commentary on “Truth Is Subjectivity,” where one might feel nothing new could be said, he manages to be innovative, by identifying “four moments” in the presentation of a theory of subjectivity (a satire, a parable, a definition, and a portrait) which make the chapter much more manageable for teaching. After considering Climacus’s presentation of the relation between Religiousness A and Religiousness B, Westphal appends a discussion of his own creation, Religiousness C (Chapter XIV). But all of this discussion would be unhelpful to a reader who does not fully appreciate the role of pseudonymity and indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works; so Westphal prefaces his entire discussion with a fine chapter on pseudonymity which can be used even in courses where the entire book is not required reading. This chapter, relating pseudonymity to twentieth-century discussions of themes such as the effacement of the author of a text and the forfeiture of the privilege of authorship, is part of a three-chapter introduction setting the Postscript in relation to Kierkegaard’s biography, pseudonymity, and the familiar theory of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages. This entire introduction is written in a remarkably [End Page 145] engaging style which will surely seduce readers new to Kierkegaard and his creation, Johannes Climacus. For example, Westphal announces that “the flow of Regina’s... (shrink)

Introduction There is faith in every serious doubt ... he who seriously denies God, affirms him . . . there is no possible atheism. ...